

STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT

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**THE USAR AS A RELEVANT FORCE TODAY,
IN ARMY XXI AND FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT**

BY

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USAWC CLASS OF 1997

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: The USAR as a Relevant Force Today, in Army XXI and for the Army After Next

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 7 April 1997 PAGES: 47 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Since the concept of an American Federal Reserve Force originated with General George Washington, the United States Army Reserve (USAR) has steadily evolved into the relevant and engaged force of today. The USAR of today provides the US Army with the preponderance of its combat service and combat service support, echelons above corps and division forces. This USAR supports the National Security and Military Strategies through worldwide deployments and the accomplishment of a wide variety of domestic missions. A critical element to this future success of the USAR is the availability and placement of the Full Time Support force. The USAR will continue as an integrated partner in Army XXI and for the Army After Next.

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PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to determine if the current Roles, Missions and Core Competencies of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) will be relevant for the Army After Next (AAN). To date, published research has not addressed these issues. This study is an exploration into this uncharted territory. Each issue requires examination in the context of its transition from today, through Army XXI, and ultimately into the AAN.

A necessary component of this study is the analysis of the total force mix, USAR force structure, availability and stationing of USAR Full Time Support (FTS) assets. These three elements are critical in determining the future success of the USAR. This study will conclude with recommendations to enhance the relevancy and readiness posture of the Army Reserve for the Army After Next.

SECTION 1
THE USAR TODAY

The initial requirement of this study is a brief background summary of the USAR. Following this background summary, this section will examine the Roles, Missions and Core Competencies of the USAR. Force structure and FTS are the final pieces necessary to provide the reader with an understanding and appreciation of todays relevant and engaged USAR.

Background:

The USAR today has evolved into an integral partner in the execution of the US Army's role in the National Security Policy. The concept of an American Federal Reserve Force originated with General George Washington. This Reserve Force evolved into the Organized Reserve Corps in 1916. The present USAR structure emerged with the reformation of the Organized Reserve Corps, circa 1950.¹

Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, adopted the 'Total Force' concept in 1973 to increase reliance on the Reserve forces as a primary augmentation source for the Active forces. The 'Total Force' concept integrates all

forces available, whether active, Reserve, civilian, or allied.² The USAR is an integrated partner in today's Army, as accentuated by the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Togo D. West:

Maintaining the Army's role as a strategic force requires the full integration of the active Army, the National Guard and the Army Reserve. When needed, the Guard and Reserve provide highly trained units and individual soldiers to support combat operations and military operations other than war (MOOTW). It is crucial that the Army have ready access to those units and individuals when the nation calls. (West and Sullivan 95, 85)³

USAR Roles and Missions:

Today's USAR plays an essential role in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement in both the international and domestic arenas⁴. Internationally, the USAR provides critical portions of the military's power projection platform, port units, transporters, and logisticians, to name but a few.

Domestically, the USAR assumes vital support roles to preserve active component (AC) combat force structure. The USAR also augments the AC during natural & manmade emergencies as the first federal response force to participate in nationwide domestic missions. Finally, the

USAR serves as a vital conduit between the people and the National Security Strategy.

There are five major overarching missions of the USAR. The first is to provide trained, ready combat service (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units to rapidly mobilize and deploy in seamless power projection force packages. Secondly, the USAR mission is to provide trained, ready individual soldiers to augment and reinforce the active Army. The third mission is to provide personnel service support for Army retirees and veterans. Fourth, the USAR provides the Continental United States power projection base enabler force. The fifth and last overarching mission is to provide the capability to reconstitute the Army during periods of national mobilization.⁵

USAR Core Competencies:

The Core Competencies, or strengths, of today's USAR support the evolving 'Total Force' Roles and Missions. The USAR is a true extension of the active Army as the only Reserve federal force capable of quickly mobilizing upon the call of the President⁶.

In the CS/CSS arena, the USAR has the preponderance of echelons above division (EAD) and echelons above corps (EAC) assets. The USAR is the principal provider of this CS and CSS force (medical, civil-affairs, engineers, maintenance, supply and transportation specialist, military police), among other related support skills. USAR personnel also quite often possess refined commensurate civilian CS/CSS skills that serve to enhance their military mission performance.


Combatant Commanders rely on USAR officer expertise and manpower to assist in their strategic planning, personnel management, logistics, finance, administration and training. The USAR also assists in the reconstitution of the Army's training base during periods of national emergency. The final Core Competency the USAR provides to the 'Total Force' is that of maintaining a vast pool of highly trained and experienced USAR soldiers to augment the active Army during times of national emergency.⁷

'Total Force' Mix/USAR Force Structure:

The USAR of FY96 (215K), represented twenty percent of the 'Total Force'. This USAR force structure was and still


is CS/CSS heavy. The following pie charts (Tables 1.0 and 2.0) illustrate the component strengths of the US Army and the mix of combat, CS, and CSS forces that support the 'Total Force'. Table 3.0 illustrates the percent of selected categories in the 'Total Force' located in the USAR. This structure enables the USAR to accomplish its missions and maintain its relevance in today's National Military Strategy.

Table 1.0



Source: OCAR-DAAR-IM

Table 2.0



Source: OCAR-DAAR-IM

Table 3.0

USAR CONTRIBUTIONS

	<u>% of Total</u>		<u>% of Total</u>
TRAINING & EXERCISE DIVISIONS	100%	THEATER AREA ARMY COMMANDS	50%
RAILWAY UNITS	100%	HOSPITALS	54%
ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR BRIGADES	100%	TERMINAL BATTALIONS	50%
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL UNITS	81%	MEDICAL GROUPS	58%
CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS	97%	CORPS SUPPORT GROUPS	42%
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNITS	83%	TRANSPORTATION COMMANDS	50%
CHEMICAL BRIGADES	75%	TRANSPORTATION GROUPS	80%
CHEMICAL BATTALIONS	67%	WATER SUPPLY BATTALIONS	33%
PETROLEUM GROUPS	50%	PETROLEUM SUPPLY BATTALIONS	46%
MEDICAL BRIGADES	82%	MOTOR BATTALIONS	55%
THEATER SIGNAL COMMANDS	66%		

Source: OCAR-DAAR-IM

As portrayed in table 3.0 above, the USAR is the primary Army source for units such as training and exercise divisions, civil affairs units, and psychological operations units. The USAR also provides a large share of medical and transportation assets to the 'Total Force'.

The USAR as An Engaged and Relevant Force:


The following global mission representation (Table 4.0) graphically illustrates the extensive engagement of USAR forces worldwide. The USAR is evolving into the 'go to' service for MOOTW (peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, nation assistance, etc.) missions. The USAR also provides a substantial augmentation force to active Army engagements worldwide (Table 4.0). The possible decline of total Army manpower resources may require the active Army to increase this reliance on the USAR.

As depicted in table 4.0, the USAR provided seventy percent of the total Reserve Component forces to Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia). This is particularly impressive given the comparative size of the USAR with the other Army components (Table 1.0). The USAR is the smallest of the

three Army components, yet often provides a disproportionately larger percentage of forces to worldwide missions (Table 4.0).

In summary, the USAR is a predominately CS/CSS heavy force engaged in supporting the National Security and Military Strategies. The USAR has developed core competencies to support these roles and missions and is a relevant and totally integrated partner in todays 'total force'.

Table 4.0



Source: OCAR-DAAR-IM

SECTION 2
THE USAR OF ARMY XXI

To properly understand the role of the USAR in Army XXI, a short overview is necessary. Army XXI is the Army of the early 21st Century, transformed from the Army of today. How the USAR of today will transform into the USAR of Army XXI is vitally important to this study. This transition strategy is the link from the USAR of today to the USAR of the Army After Next.

Army XXI, Objectives:

Five major objectives comprise Army XXI. The first objective is that of **Dominate Maneuver**, which is the positioning of forces to attack decisive points, defeat the enemy center of gravity, and accomplish campaign objectives. The two critical elements of Dominate Maneuver are time and speed. The second objective of Army XXI is ensuring the capability of **conducting precision strikes** to defeat the enemy of the future. Third, is the **projection and sustainment** of forces in the theater of operations. Simultaneous to the accomplishment of all objectives is the fourth objective of **protection** of the combat and support

forces. The fifth and final Army XXI objective is that of **winning the information war.**⁸

The Army of the future will be a modular power projection Army, with a broad range of missions, highly adaptable, versatile, and capable of functioning in a constrained resources environment. This Army of the early 21st Century will be highly lethal, survivable, and capable of sustained high tempo operations. It must also be rapidly deployable and mobile with increased reliance on the joint community.⁹

USAR Transition to Army XXI:

The USAR is continuously planning for and adjusting to future roles and missions. One example of this mission transition is the "Offsite Agreement" of 1993. The USAR leadership anticipated the future need for a relevant CS/CSS force and agreed to a transfer of functions among the three US Army components. In retrospect, this decision will serve to ensure USAR future relevance in this area. The agreement directed the USAR to focus on providing the combat service support mission during wartime, and the Guard to focus on a

wartime combat mission and a peacetime domestic emergency mission.¹⁰

Another vehicle for planning the USAR transition from today, to the Army of the future, is the USAR Long Range Plan (LRP). The most recently published USAR LRP (1993) contained a number of accurate future assumptions that have become reality. The Department of Defense (DoD) slice of the federal budget has steadily declined. There seems to be a national trend to focus inward on domestic issues at the expense of international issues. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) are increasing at a significant rate. The US Army and international community have become increasingly involved in Humanitarian Assistance (HA) missions since the end of the Cold War. Humanitarian Assistance operations are those worldwide missions designed to reduce deaths and alleviate human suffering on a massive scale.¹¹ Between 1978 and 1985, an average of five complex international humanitarian emergencies had occurred each year. By the year 1992, the number had grown to 17. This trend seems to indicate a continued increase in these type missions. One reason offered for this trend is the advancing technology of instant worldwide media coverage of disasters and human

suffering.¹² This media attention often results in public pressure for US assistance. As correctly predicted in the 1993 LRP, US Army MOOTW missions are rapidly increasing.





A flawed assumption in the 1993 LRP was that the USAR would receive the necessary resources to accomplish the additional MOOTW missions.¹³ This is not the case, and the USAR is doing more with fewer resources.

Finally, the USAR is accomplishing Army XXI transition planning through the key placement of FTS senior officers through-out Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in combat development planning cells.

Tiered Resourcing:

To meet the Army XXI challenge the USAR has adopted a tiered resourcing strategy (Table 5.0). Tiered resourcing is a strategy to prioritize severely limited resources. This method of resourcing ensures the readiness of the high priority units, unfortunately, at the expense of the lower priority units. Table 5.0 illustrates this resource distribution strategy and the resultant effect upon each tier.

Table 5.0

TIERED RESOURCING				
FY 98 - USAR 208K				
TIER I	TIER II	TIER III	TIER IV	TIER V
CONTINGENCY RESPONSE FORCE C2 OR BETTER  FSP 1-2 & SOCOM 420 UNITS USARC FSP 182 - 39.9 K SOF FSP - 7.4 K TOTAL 47.5 K +15% OVERMANNING = 54.6 K (355 USARC UNITS) (65 SOF UNITS)  CONUS SUPPORT BASE TDA HQ 445 UNITS  \$1BM Resourcing Data for FSP 1-2 off-set by increment to 2d MRC CS/CSS & Div (X)s	2d MRC CS/CSS C3 OR BETTER  COTW COTW - 5.6 K (81 UNITS)  XX (EX) READYNESS ENHANCEMENT DIV (EX) 12.8 K PERFORMS 50% OF MISSION  CSB CONUS SPT BASE CONUS MED SPT GARRISONS 4.7 K  RC CS / CSS 89.5 K	READINESS ENHANCEMENT 70% CAPABLE  INSTALL SPT 8.2 K DIVISION (IT) - (MINUS SCHOOL BDES) XX (IT) - 5.2 K X  ECT	USAR C2 MOB/TNG SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT 70% CAPABLE  TDA HQ 10.2 K DIVISION (IT) - (MINUS SCHOOLS) XX (IT) - 1.1 K X  CS CSUT  C4 -1.0 K	

Source: OCAR-DAAR-IM


Full Time Support:

An extremely critical element to the success of tiered resourcing is the key placement of FTS personnel to perform those minimal essential tasks of maintaining unit readiness. Minimal essential tasks are unit personnel, administration, training and logistics functions.

Full Time Support personnel assist in unit and individual training and provide maintenance to equipment, facilities, supplies and records. They often perform unit functions that require difficult-to-train and difficult-to-maintain skills, such as day-to-day command and control. Without these key full time personnel assets, mission readiness will degrade.

Table 6.0 illustrates the USAR position in FTS resourcing relative the other Department of Defense Reserve Components. As currently structured, the USAR must constantly shift limited FTS assets to the highest priority units.

Table 6.0




Source: DAAR-OFD-FTS

An added challenge to the inequitable distribution of the constrained FTS resources is the overwhelming demand for senior officers and senior enlisted soldiers to fill key staff, Army level and above, positions. The USAR provides FTS soldiers to assist in the planning and execution of USAR related missions at all Army and above levels. This

requires FTS staffing at Major Army Commands, Installations, Commander-In-Chief (CINC) staffs, Joint staffs and throughout DoD. This lack of adequate FTS personnel could adversely effect the USAR ability to perform future missions.

There currently is not a standardized method of determining and authorizing FTS requirements within the DoD Reserve Components community. Each Service uses their own independent method. The USAR uses the Tiered Resourcing strategy previously noted in this study, beginning with the filling of minimal essential positions in each unit. Table 7.0 illustrates the USAR authorization shortfall for FY96 FTS to fill necessary FTS requirements. This problem will only compound in the future without additional FTS resources.

Table 7.0



Source: DAAR-OFD-FTS

SECTION 3 THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE

Army planners predict a high tech, mobile and lethal force for the early to mid 21st century. To facilitate an attempt to forecast and understand the role of the USAR, a short summary of this futuristic Army is necessary. This section outlines that future Army and it's reliance on the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) .


The Army After Next Program - A Summary:

The Army Chief Of Staff (CSA) established the AAN in February 1996 as a vehicle of providing the Army leadership with a long-term view of the Army's future. The primary focus of AAN is for the years 2010 to 2025 and is a TRADOC program. The CSA included two concurrent tasks requirements when establishing AAN: (1) connect Army XXI, the Army's transformation process, to AAN and (2) ensure the vision connects to the Army's research and development (R&D) programs (Table 8.0) .

The mission of the AAN is to:

Conduct broad studies of warfare to about the year 2025 to frame issues vital to the development of the US Army after about 2010 and to provide those issues to the senior Army leadership in a format suitable for integration into TRADOC combat development programs. (Hartzog 96, 18)¹⁴

Table 8.0.



Source: AAN TRADOC Slide Presentation

The AAN program will continue to annually focus on 15 to 30 years out, ensuring the Army is always looking into the future at approximately the 30 year mark. This extended

focus guarantees development of issues well beyond the restrictions of the program objective memorandum (POM).¹⁵

The focus of the AAN study is in four broad areas:

(1). **The Geostategic setting of 2025:** State-on-state relations will dominate this time period. Several nation states or nation state groups, will develop manufacturing and technologies nearly comparable as those of the US. These nation states or nation state groups could pose a security threat to the US that is greater than the threat posed by the Soviet Union in the 70s and 80s.¹⁶

(2). **Human Organizational Issues:** The information technology revolution is the single most important factor forcing change in the US Army organizational structure.¹⁷ The soldiers and leaders of the AAN (entering the military today), will be expected to master a variety of missions. They will face competitors possessing both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Also, proficiency at low-intensity peacekeeping and aid to civil authorities type missions will be a necessity. The soldier of the AAN will need to think decisively and quickly enough to control the tempo of operations, allocate firepower efficiently and

allocate forces with the least possible cost of human life.¹⁸

(3). The Evolution of Military Art to 2025:

Clausewitz's trinity of people, state, and Army will continue to be a primary strategic planning tool. Due to the speed of information on the battlefield and the advancement of weapons technology, mastery of the "operational level" of war will be critical in the AAN. Time will also emerge as a more critical factor on the battlefield of the AAN. The American expectation of a "short successful war" will most likely only become more pronounced, therefore, requiring the strategic planners to calculate public will into any future conflict. Also, extended operations will run the risk of exhausting expensive precision weaponry.¹⁹

(4). Technology and Trends to 2025: Centralized technological systems will dictate more centralized control of the battlefield. At the same time the proliferation of other technologies, information being one, will dictate decentralized control and application at the lowest level. The AAN planners will struggle with this dilemma as they continue to study future warfare.

Army After Next planners are also dealing with the strategic issue of "procurement agility". Will the Army of the future develop advanced technology or simply buy it off the shelf?²⁰ Other areas of technological challenges to the AAN planners are those of space, maneuver, information and urban warfare. Each will produce a unique set of problems for the battlefield of 2025.²¹

The TRADOC first annual report to the CSA, June 1996, highlighted four key issues. The first is that a peer competitor is not likely to emerge in the next 30 years and the fundamental factors of war (geopolitical) will also not change dramatically. Secondly, state-on-state conflict will continue as the focus for contingency planning in the use of US forces. Third, future war is visual, tactical, operational and strategic, as well as political. The fourth and final key issue is that human and organizational factors will dominate and shape technology.²²

Revolution in Military Affairs - A Background:

An understanding of the RMA, its background and effect on the AAN, is essential to the study of US Army future roles and missions.

An RMA is a major change in the nature of warfare precipitated by the innovative application of technologies. These technological innovations drive changes in military doctrine and operational art, which fundamentally alter the nature and conduct of warfare.²³

There are three types of RMAs. The first is an RMA purely driven by military technological advancements, resulting from fundamental scientific or technological developments. The second is an RMA driven by operational and organizational innovation that redresses a strategic problem. The third type of an RMA is dependent on fundamental economical, political, and social changes, apart from the immediate military domain. These outside influences fundamentally transform the nature and conduct of warfare.²⁴

The current debate, whether an RMA is in progress, centers around technological innovations. Are the current technological innovations truly revolutionary in nature, or simply an evolution of existing weapons systems capabilities? Both sides of this issue enjoy strong support within the defense community. However, if current technological advancements truly change doctrine and the

operational nature of warfare, then, the US Army is indeed experiencing an RMA.

Research for this essay supports the theory that an RMA is truly in progress. This RMA is the result of three primary factors. First is a rapid technological advance compelling a shift from the industrial to the information age. Secondly the end of the cold war, and third, the decline in defense budgets.²⁵

The current RMA is a combination of type one (technical) and two (strategic). While it is primarily technological in nature, it also addresses strategic problems. The RMA strategic innovations, along with the technological developments, will eventually alter operational art and organizational structure. The current RMA is not primarily a by-product of social, political and economical changes that influence the nature and conduct of warfare (type three).

The Relationship between the RMA and AAN:

In essence, the AAN draws on the innovations and information resulting from the RMA. The AAN incorporates RMA technological and strategic innovations, resulting in

doctrinal change that constitutes a true Revolution in Military Affairs.

The military goal of both programs is full spectrum dominance on the future battlefield. Planners agree on the operational concepts to achieve this goal. The concepts of Dominate Maneuver, Precision Strike or Engagement, Focused Logistics, Rapid Deployment, Survivability or Force Protections, and focus on Winning the Information War are key elements of the RMA and AAN program. Both agree in terms of the three levels of future warfare: (1) the ultra high tech, quick strike, lethal, active "strike force", (2) a back up, less high tech, "presence force," and the (3) third level or mobilized and "sustaining force".

The Revolution in Military Affairs will have a profound influence on the AAN program, which will, in turn, effect doctrine and the conduct and nature of warfare. These changes will ultimately dictate adjusted roles and missions for the total US Army.

SECTION 4
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

Future USAR Roles and Missions for the AAN:

Specific component roles, missions, and structure guidance is not currently an issue for Army XXI and AAN planners. Published guidance and recommendations are not available at this time. By design the planners focus on the future and not on the constraints of the present. To forecast the roles and missions of the USAR in the AAN, connectivity is necessary between the roles and missions of Army XXI and the AAN. Therefore, these conclusions will attempt to provide that forecast for the USAR and bridge the gap from today, through Army XXI, into the AAN.


The USAR is no longer primarily a 'reserve' force. In addition to the role of augmenting the Active Army during emergencies, the USAR engages in a wide variety of real time missions (Table 4.0). This trend will increase in the future, (particularly MOOTW). This mission expansion, for all US Army components, has already begun, as evidenced by the fact that US Army operational deployments have increased

300 percent since 1989.²⁶ This trend will translate to a more deployed and engaged USAR.

A current USAR Role, which will increase through Army XXI into the AAN, is that of providing a critical portion of the military's Power Projection Platform. Power Projection Platforms are those Continental United States Military Bases that have the capability for deploying significant military forces worldwide. As the Active forces decline, more reliance will shift to the Reserve Components to accomplish this vital mission. The USAR, as the Power Projection Enabler, has anticipated this requirement and has structured Garrison Support Units, Port and Terminal Units, and USAR installations to fulfill this increasing reliance on the USAR. Table 9.0 illustrates the emphasis the USAR has placed on its role as a Power Projection Platform Enabler by stationing a Garrison Support Unit to augment each installation. As US overseas presence decreases, the importance of Power Projection increases. Due to declining active Army manpower resources, the USAR will be dead center in this mission as the future Primary Power Projection Enabler.

Table 9.0

USAR POWER PROJECTION ENABLERS



Source: OCAR-DAAR-IM

The USAR, as a principal transporter in today's 'Total Force', can anticipate this role to continue and expand in Army XXI and the AAN. The USAR currently contributes a large portion (Table 3.0), of the transportation assets to the total Army. The AAN will rely heavily on the strategic mobility of combat forces. Given the active Army current

and projected constrained resource environment, an ever increasing portion of this transportation requirement will transfer to the USAR.

Finally, a current USAR role that will increase dramatically in the future, is that of providing a conduit between the National Military Strategy and the American people. As the role of the USAR increases in Army XXI and the AAN, the citizen-soldier becomes more integrated into the planning and execution of the National Military Strategy. This translates to far more public exposure of USAR missions, since the USAR soldiers performing those missions, are the public. Consequently, society at large will gain a better awareness and understanding of the National Military Strategy and mission execution.

The five major overarching USAR missions addressed earlier in this paper will also expand in Army XXI and the AAN. The USAR is the principal EAD and EAC CS and CSS unit provider and this trend should continue. The USAR mission of providing trained, ready individual soldiers to augment and reinforce the active Army is already on the increase. The USAR of the future will continue to provide the

critically important mission of personnel service support for Army retirees and veterans of all components.

Future USAR Core Competencies for the AAN:

As with roles and missions, connectivity is necessary from today, through Army XXI into the AAN. As the USAR executes future roles and missions, new core competencies will emerge as traditional core competencies enhance. The lack of specific Army XXI and AAN structure guidance to the contrary predicates the USAR should continue as the principal provider of EAD and EAC CS/CSS, forces (Table 2.0). This is particularly relevant in the areas of medical, transportation, civil affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOPS), (Table 3.0). Transforming the active Army into a leaner, combat intensive force will require assigning more CS and CSS missions to the USAR, ensuring continued relevance in this area.

The Army XXI battle dynamic of Early Entry falls directly into the USAR strength of CA and PSYOPS. Early Entry is the Army XXI term used to define the initially deployed forces of an operation.²⁷ These forces will depend heavily on some aspect of CA operations. Currently, the

USAR owns 36 of 37 CA battalions and declining active Army force structure indicates this trend will continue. This will result in the Early Entry forces having a sizable USAR (CA/PSYOP) and civilian contingent.²⁸ The current and projected reliance of the active Army on the USAR in this area ensures this core competency will continue.

A Core Competency that the USAR will maintain and strengthen into Army XXI and the AAN is that of providing the trained and ready reserve individuals to augment the active Army during times of national emergency. This has been a traditional USAR mission and all indications are it will remain as a primary USAR mission.

The USAR will emerge from Army XXI as the primary trainer for the "total force". The USAR has already reorganized the Training Divisions into Institutional Training Divisions (DIVIT) and Exercise Divisions (DIVEX) in anticipation of this expanded future role.²⁹ The "Total Army" of the future will be much smaller and will increase its reliance on these DIVITs and DIVEXs to provide those trained units and individuals. USAR training missions will increase due to the already established core competency and cost effectiveness.³⁰

Future USAR Force Structure for the AAN:

USAR force structure for the AAN is dependent on the final distribution of roles and missions. The AAN roles and missions will be flexible to meet the battlefield and future world environment. This is due to the TRADOC AAN charter, issued by the CSA, which specifically directed the AAN program to not initially address the Roles and Missions issue.³¹ The CSA guidance emphasized the battlefield and future world environment.

Currently, as previously outlined in this essay, the USAR is the echelons above division and echelons above corps CS/CSS force. This course was fixed for the USAR at the offsite of 1993. As this trend continues, structure adjustments will be necessary to compensate for new (mostly MOOTW) or deleted missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Increased Full Time Support:

First and foremost, the most important recommendation is to obtain additional USAR FTS resources. All other recommendations directly relate to this issue. The success of the USAR in Army XXI and the AAN relates directly to sufficient FTS resources to direct and perform the unit minimal essential readiness tasks. The demand for staffing of senior level FTS positions throughout the Army, Joint and DoD communities will also drain these limited assets.

Without adequate FTS resources to maintain minimal unit readiness, a National Strategy dependent upon the rapid deployment and engagement of USAR units is suspect.

CS/CSS Core Competency:

The USAR Core Competency as the CS/CSS expert and provider should continue. As MOOTW increases in importance, so will the CS/CSS support elements. As indicated in the body of this study, the active component AAN will be a lean combat oriented force, relying heavily on the USAR to provide CS/CSS capabilities. The key is to anticipate where

the need will be and adjust USAR CS/CSS structure to meet that need.

Power Projection Enabler:

The USAR should continue to place importance on the GSU role as a power projection enabler. Garrison Support USAR Units will be relied upon heavily for their power projection capabilities for Army XXI and the AAN. Power projection is the direction of the AAN and the USAR will be the key enabler.

CINC and Joint Billets FTS/TPU:

It is vitally important for the USAR to build on its close association with the various Joint and CINC staffs. An example of this is the Atlantic Command shadow USAR Troop Program Unit (TPU) staff. This recently introduced concept, where a TPU augments a CINC staff ensures close ties between the USAR and CINC. The USAR leadership should consider expansion of this concept to all CINCs. Also, if additional FTS resources are allocated, the USAR needs to increase CINC and Joint FTS billets.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper was to determine if the current Roles, Missions and Core Competencies of the USAR would be relevant for the Army of the early and mid 21st century (Army XXI and AAN). The answer to that question is, an emphatic yes.

Research for this paper validates the fact that the USAR of today is relevant, engaged, and an integral US Army partner in execution of the National Military Strategy. Beginning with the Offsite of 1993, the USAR has strategically postured itself to ensure this relevancy will continue through Army XXI. This paper profiles steps that the USAR is taking to solidify its position as the CS/CSS force of the future.

The USAR continues to strengthen its Core Competencies in anticipation of future Army XXI and AAN missions. As the US Army leadership determines specific AAN Roles and Missions, the USAR will adjust structure accordingly. The critical question will be the allocation of adequate FTS resources to perform the minimal essential tasks associated with those missions. Assuming the proper allocation of FTS,

the USAR will remain a genuinely integrated and relevant partner in the 'total force' of the Army After Next.

Endnotes

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³Togo D. West and Gordon R. Sullivan, Meeting the Challenges of Today, Tomorrow, and the 21st Century: A Posture Statement of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1996, Posture Statement Presented to the 104th Congress (Washington: US Department of the Army, 1995), 85.

⁴Togo D. West and Dennis J. Reimer, Meeting the Challenges of Today, Tomorrow, and the 21st Century: A Posture Statement of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1997, Posture Statement Presented to the 104th Congress, 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 1996), 26-30.

⁵Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), USAR Overview Presented to General Officer Forum-NCR (Washington: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, DAAR-IM, 15 June 1996), 5.

⁶Dennis J. Reimer. "ROA National Security Report," The Officer (March 1996): 22.

⁷Ibid., 22.

⁸Department of the Army, America's Army of the 21st Century Force XXI, Meeting the 21st Century Challenge (Washington: US Department of the Army, 15 January 1995), 22.

⁹Ibid., 6-7.

¹⁰Robert L. Goldrich, "Army Reserve Components: Current Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report For Congress (Washington: Library of Congress, March 1996), 4.

¹¹National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1996 Instruments of U.S. Power (Washington: U.S. Printing Office, 1996), 138.

¹²Andrew S. Natsios, "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and U.S. Policy," The Washington Quarterly Vol 17, No. 1 (Winter 1994): 129.

¹³Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), United States Army Reserve Long-Range Plan 1993-2023 (Washington: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Summer 1993), 4.

¹⁴Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, William W. Hartzog, "Report on the Army After Next Program," memorandum for General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff, United States Army, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 18 June 1996, 2.

¹⁵Ibid., 3.

¹⁶Ibid., 5-6.

¹⁷Ibid., 8.

¹⁸Ibid., 8-9.

¹⁹Ibid., 9-11.

²⁰Robert B. Killebrew, "The Army After Next, TRADOC's Crystal Ball Eyes the Service's Shape Beyond Force XXI," Armed Forces Journal International (October 1996): 45.

²¹Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, William W.Hartzog, "Report on the Army After Next Program," memorandum for General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff, United States Army, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 18 June 1996, 12-14.

²²Major Daniel Egbert, "Army After Next (AAN)," Information Paper for the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Washington DC, 6 November 1996, 1.

²³Earl H. Tilford, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 23 June 1995), PTI-1.

²⁴Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 15 July 1994), 20-21.

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²⁷Training and Doctrine Command, Force XXI Operations, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August 1994), Glossary-3.

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³⁰William J. Nagy, "CSS Force Multiplier," Army Reserve (Fall 1996): 14-15.

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